From 1816 to 1851

Among the state constitutional provisions prohibiting the exercise of powers to suspend laws other than by legislative authority (which I posted yesterday), I included the version that Indiana had in its 1816 constitution.  That version, from Article 1, Section 6 of Indiana's previous (and original) constitution, reads, "That no power of suspending the operation of the laws, shall be exercised, except by the Legislature, or its authority."

That way of phrasing it, adding those three words so as to permit the suspension of the operation of the laws by the legislature "or its authority," appeared in a few additional state constitutional provisions that I listed, yesterday, and they seem to indicate an intent (for the states that have or had those provisions in their constitutions, for as long as they actually had them in their constitutions) to allow someone other than the legislatures of such states to suspend their laws, provided that the suspension is carried out in accordance with authorization for it that had been granted by the legislature.  It would be unjustifiable to assume that this necessarily would permit the legislature of such a state to grant an unconditional, open-ended authority to anyone to suspend the laws of the state (or the operation of its laws), which would itself permit the legislature to make a major change to the state's form of government without even being required to amend its constitution in order to do so.  I also note that a few states that used that sort of wording (which would allow their laws to be suspended either by the state legislature itself or by someone acting with the authority of the legislature) required that any such authority delegated by the legislature be limited to specific, defined cases.

However, none of that any longer concerns Indiana.  The current version of this rule, which, as I have stated before, now appears in Article 1, Section 26 of the Indiana Constitution, replaced the previous version when our current state constitution was adopted in 1851.  Article 1, Section 26 reads, "The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly."  It would take much more effort (and imagination) to believe that this version leave the Indiana General Assembly the latitude to confer upon somebody else the lawful power to turn our state's laws off and on at will.  That possibility is even less plausible considering that this wording of Article 1, Section 26 was chosen as a replacement for the wording of its 1816 counterpart: the change eliminates the "or its authority" language.  In addition to this, we should never forget that the entire purpose of these "suspension" clauses is to prevent the executive from assuming a power to suspend the laws, and, ultimately, to ensure that the power to alter the laws either temporarily or indefinitely remains in the hands of the legislature -- where it is supposed to be.

Denial Of A Power To Suspend Laws

I mentioned that the Constitution of Indiana forbids suspension of the operation of the laws other than by the authority of the General Assembly -- the body in which the legislative power of the state is vested.  Considering that the legislative power can be used to create or add to the statute law of the state, or to amend it, or to expunge parts of it (if the General Assembly chooses to do so), it makes sense that the power to temporarily mute or modify the effect of a provision of law would belong to the General Assembly itself.

This conclusion would be unavoidable even if the Indiana Constitution's Bill of Rights (Article 1 of the constitution) did not explicitly forbid suspension of the operation of the laws by any other authority.  It is among the principal settled doctrines defining the republican form of government as known to America that the legislative power may not be used without the consent of the representatives of the people in their legislative assembly.  However, I will provide some information about the history of Article 1, Section 26 of the Indiana Constitution in order to intercept and correct an error that I would otherwise expect many people to be tempted to make -- thinking that the rule imposed by Section 26 of Indiana's Bill of Rights is an unimportant, trifling provision that happened to find its way into our constitution but which nobody ever really even know or cared about.  (Believing that might make it easier for some people to justify to themselves willfully disregarding and directly violating it.)

The appearance of rules against any power of suspending the laws (or the execution of them) in American constitutions began around the beginning of the independence of the newly United States, which states had before that time been (as everyone reading this presumably knows) English colonies.  Though the American Revolution did result in independence, it began with Americans of these colonies attempting to vindicate rights that they understood the laws of England to have guaranteed to them.  It consequently can be no surprise that when the time came for these Americans to form their own governments and laws, they made an effort to protect these rights for themselves.

In English law, it was the English Bill of Rights in 1689 (sometimes dated to 1688 for technical reasons that are not worth explaining) that explicitly established protection from the suspension of laws.  Many parts of the English Bill of Rights responded to and were meant to prohibit in the future the exercise of powers that had been assumed by James II, a king of England whose reign had very recently ended -- powers which Parliament alone could lawfully possess.  Among these were the powers to dispense with or suspend the laws or their execution.  One part of the English Bill of Rights is a list of grievances against England's former king, and among the ways it identifies in which that king had wronged the kingdom, the Bill of Rights names, "By assuming and exercising a power of dispensing with and suspending of laws and the execution of laws without consent of Parliament".

A different part of the English Bill of Rights is a declaration of rights, or a declaration of some of the laws of England in relation to rights.  This part of the Bill of Rights also condemns as illegal the powers to dispense with or suspend the laws without consent of the legislature: "...That the pretended power of suspending the laws or the execution of laws by regal authority without consent of Parliament is illegal;" and "...That the pretended power of dispensing with laws or the execution of laws by regal authority, as it hath been assumed and exercised of late, is illegal".

The American Declaration of Independence condemned a similar offense in 1776, though the grievance in that case had (quickly) grown more severe: “For suspending our own legislatures, and declaring themselves invested with power to legislate for us in all cases whatsoever”....

Beginning in the spring of 1776, these former colonies began to create state constitutions to govern themselves.  Following independence and the creation of the United States Constitution, they were joined by additional new states which likewise created for themselves new state constitutions.  The following are all of the state constitutional provisions that I found concerning the suspension of laws (up through the year 1842).  From this point, there is little that I can add through narration, so I will just list the following American state constitutional provisions.  They are grouped by state.


Delaware declaration of rights, 1776.  "Sect. 7.  That no power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought to be exercised unless by the Legislature."

Delaware Declaration of Rights, 1792.  "Article I.  Section 10.  No power of suspending laws shall be exercised, but by authority of the legislature."

Pennsylvania, 1790.  "Article IX.  Of suspending laws.  Sect. XII.  That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the legislature, or its authority."

Pennsylvania, 1838.  "Article IX.  Suspending laws.  Section XII.  No power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the legislature, or its authority."

Massachusetts, 1780.  "Art. XX.  The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of the laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the legislature shall expressly provide for."

Maryland, 1776.  "VII.  That no power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, unless by or derived from the Legislature, ought to be exercised or allowed."

New Hampshire, 1783.  "XXIX.  The power of suspending the laws, or the execution of them, ought never to be exercised but by the Legislature, or by authority derived therefrom, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the Legislature shall expressly provide for."

Virginia Declaration of Rights, 1776.  "VII.  That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority without consent of the representatives of the people is injurious to their rights and ought not to be exercised."

North Carolina, 1776.  "V.  That all powers of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without consent of the Representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised."

Vermont, 1786.  "XVII.  The power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws ought never to be exercised, but by the Legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases only as the Legislature shall expressly provide for."

Vermont, 1793.  "Article XV.  The power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, ought never to be exercised but by the legislature, or by authority derived from it, to be exercised in such particular cases, as this constitution, or the legislature, shall provide for."

Kentucky, 1792.  "Article XII.  XIV.  That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the Legislature or its authority."

Kentucky, 1798.  "Article VI.  14.  That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the Legislature or its authority."

Ohio, 1803.  "Article VIII.  Sec 9.  That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, unless by the Legislature."

Louisiana, 1812.  "Article VI.  Sec. 17.  No power of suspending the laws of this state shall be exercised, unless by the legislature or its authority."

Indiana, 1816.  "Article I.  Sect. 6th.  That no power of suspending the operation of the laws, shall be exercised, except by the Legislature, or its authority."

Mississippi, 1817.  "Article I.  Section 15.  That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised except by the Legislature or its authority."

Mississippi, 1832.  "Article I.  Sect. 15.  That no power of suspending laws shall be exercised, except by the legislature, or its authority."

Alabama, 1819.  "Article I.  SEC. 15.  No power of suspending laws shall be exercised, except by the General Assembly, or its authority."

Maine, 1820.  "Article I.  Sect. 13.  The laws shall not be suspended but by the legislature or its authority."

In addition to the relevant provisions from these state constitutions, I also include the following requests for an amendment (which are nearly identical to each other) to the United States Constitution; these requests were made by conventions called in Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island to consider ratification of the Constitution.  Obviously, no such amendment to the United States Constitution was ever made, but anyone with a sincere interest in the meaning or the importance of the corresponding provision in the present-day Indiana Constitution should give them the attention that they are due.

Virginia Ratification, commentary and proposal, 1788.  "Seventh, That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the consent of the representatives of the people in the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised."

North Carolina Convention, Requesting Amendments but Declining to Immediately Ratify, Declaration of Rights, 1789.  "7th.  That all power of suspending laws, or the execution of laws by any authority without the consent of the representatives, of the people in the Legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised."

Rhode Island and Providence Plantations Ratification, declaration of rights, 1790.  "7th That all power of suspending laws or the execution of laws, by any authority without the consent of the representatives of the people in the legislature, is injurious to their rights, and ought not to be exercised."

Special Session of the Indiana General Assembly Needed Before May

A few points:

First, though in its details, this is another post that directly concerns only the State of Indiana, its subject is conceptually inseparable from one of the defining features of what government in America is supposed to be: what the U.S. Constitution refers to as the "Republican Form of Government".

Second, I apologize for not saying something about this sooner.  Though I did hear about Governor Eric Holcomb's decision to delay Indiana's 2020 primary elections in response to the pandemic (which, considered purely as a matter of policy, I think is a necessary move) when the decision was announced a few weeks ago, it did not initially occur to me that timing of Indiana's primary elections is already set by the Indiana Code itself, and I was not aware at that time that Executive Order 20-07 attempts to "suspend" that provision of state law.

Third and finally, the main point of this post is this: in order to lawfully reschedule this year's primary elections in Indiana, which in accordance with IC 3-10-1-3 were to take place on May 5th, Governor Holcomb must call a special session of the Indiana General Assembly as soon as possible.  Indiana's primary elections do need to be rescheduled from May 5th, this year, but the May 5th date was set by the laws of our state (again, specifically IC 3-10-1-3) as established by its legislative power, which is vested in the General Assembly (see Article 4, Section 1 of the Indiana Constitution; for those seeking optional material for personal enrichment, see also Article 3).  Only the legislative power can alter or suspend prior acts of legislation, and only the General Assembly can use the legislative power.

I have no serious doubt that in issuing Executive Order 20-07, to suspend IC 3-10-1-3 and temporarily substitute for it a new rule to operate just as though it were the law, Governor Holcomb believed that he had lawful authority to do so.  I assume that advisers told him so, though that regrettably would mean that whatever they told him was wrong.  They ought to have known something about our form of government, and the notion of a legislative power being vested in the legislature ought to have been comprehensible enough to them, but it is a mystery how they managed to keep their error intact given that the Indiana Constitution was designed to drive that very error into extinction.  Indiana's Bill of Rights is Article 1 of the Indiana Constitution, and Section 26 of that Bill of Rights provides: "The operation of the laws shall never be suspended, except by the authority of the General Assembly."  In placing this in our Bill of Rights, Indiana has followed the example set by the English Bill of Rights (1689), which explicitly abolished this power in England (shortly after a recent king had effectively created it by asserting that power, despite having no lawful authority to do it, and getting enough people to act as though it were legal ... for a while, anyway), in addition to the example set by a number of the individual United States.  It is probable that those advisers simply had never read the Indiana Constitution.  (If I ever receive confirmation of that, I will try to find the Governor some better advisers.)

Though the Indiana Constitution explicitly forbids any authority other than the Indiana General Assembly to suspend the operation of the laws of the state, the same constitution fortunately has granted the Governor ample lawful power to ensure that this year's primaries are rescheduled as needed.  Article 4, Section 9 gives the Governor the power "at any time by proclamation" to "call a special session" of the Indiana General Assembly.  Additionally, Article 5, Section 20 provides, "Should the seat of government become dangerous from disease or a common enemy, the Governor may convene the General Assembly at any other place."  This is both fortunate and fitting; we can see that the Indiana Constitution was designed for people who would not surrender or abandon either the rule of law or the determination to remain a free state, even when facing the extraordinary dangers posed by infection or invasion.

The usual chambers of the House of Representatives and the Senate at the Statehouse would most likely be an unsuitable meeting place until the infamous virus ceases to be a problem.  Consequently, the Governor will be able to convene the General Assembly "at any other place".  It is convenient that in calling this immediate special session, there will be (I suspect) an abundance of spacious, well ventilated, vacant space where the General Assembly will be able to conduct its business with the danger of infection all but eliminated.  Unless we are certain that the Statehouse will be a safe meeting place for the General Assembly later in the year, though I doubt that we can be entirely certain what the state of the pandemic will be at that time, we ought to be prepared for the possibility that the General Assembly will need to be convened at some "other place" then.  For the General Assembly to conduct its business efficiently at a location other than the Statehouse, I assume that there will be problems needing to be solved, details needing to be settled, and, perhaps, appropriations needing to be made.  It ought to be easier to deal with that experience now than later, as it currently will at least be easy enough to find enough vacant (and, ideally, inexpensive) space so that the legislature will have somewhere to sit.

I urge Governor Holcomb to immediately call a special session of the Indiana General Assembly.  Only by doing so can Indiana's 2020 primary elections be legally moved.  It will give the General Assembly the opportunity that it needs to reschedule the primaries itself, legitimately -- as well as to pass any other laws needed in order to adapt the machinery of Indiana's government to the unusual circumstances of this pandemic (and, as always, for the redress of grievances).

This is a matter of greater importance than it might superficially appear, so expect me to keep an eye on this issue.

To Summarize That

My recent post about "George Washington's Greatest Challenge", like many of these posts, is quite long.  I still think that it was all worth writing, but since a succinct version will have its own value:

Though the conduct of his countrymen over the course of many years did lead George Washington to have serious doubts as to whether free government in America would succeed and survive, he was too dedicated to it and to his country to allow his despair to keep him from doing all that could be done for it.

It is amazing to me to see how many demonstrations can be found in Washington’s letters of both his despair and his resolve, existing simultaneously.  It seems that determination can outlive hope, and that to that fact we owe our Constitution and the union.

George Washington's Greatest Challenge

I write this for those of you who need it most.  If you are one of these people, you will know it once you have read it.

Not long ago, I read some of George Washington's correspondence from the years 1786 and 1787.   I was surprised to find that as he considered the challenges facing America at that point in time -- of which all related in one way or another to the failure of the confederation government, a regular neglect of what was necessary in order to maintain the union, and a seemingly widespread failure of Americans themselves to appreciate as indispensable the unity of America -- Washington saw serious reason to doubt that Americans, under those circumstances, would ultimately overcome these challenges.

I do not mean to say that Washington affirmatively believed that America would fail.  I only mean that the challenges facing America in the mid-1780s, in the years immediately preceding the Constitutional Convention in 1787 (and then the Constitution's ratification) -- many resembling those that America faces today -- appeared daunting even to George Washington.  It was (as it now is) the need for Americans to unite by choice for something extraordinarily positive, overcoming the formidable obstacles to it, at a time when the immediate threat of outside military force was (as it now is) unavailable as an impetus to union.

As odd as it may seem, this type of crisis is in some ways more daunting, appears more intractable, and may more readily inspire despair, than the crisis of war, even with all of the hardship, pain, destruction, death, and horror that are known to accompany war.  These two types of challenges are very different from each other, and Washington’s letters can both show that and provide comfort and inspiration to those who are dispirited by our present crisis.

Washington had only recently finished leading the army that defeated the British Empire and won America’s Independence.  Although he (and the other Patriots) did not achieve this alone, relying only on their own strength to defeat the British, they had made the decision in favor of independence without any guarantee of their victory or survival.  They intended to seek the aid of France, but they had no assurances that they would succeed in obtaining it or that it would be adequate to overcome Great Britain.  Nevertheless, as desperate as their situation was and must constantly have felt to those who endured and fought that war, they triumphed.

Yet, only a few short years after succeeding in all of this, Washington watched with dismay as the conduct of many of his own countrymen seemed to prove them unequal to the task of governing themselves.  The union itself was dissolving, of course, and for a short time (a little time being more than enough), at least one of its constituent states was in some danger of being violently overthrown by an army consisting of a faction of its own citizens.  The spectacle led Washington to ask, if only rhetorically, whether perhaps the British and the Tories knew something that the Patriots had not: that the American people were not competent to organize and maintain their own governments.

And that is why I wrote this commentary on these quotes: As George Washington witnessed the way the most visible (due to their conduct) of his fellow Americans acted in the months leading up to the Constitutional Convention, even given the remarkable triumph that they had just achieved together in the Revolutionary War, and even though the first act of each state upon attaining Independence was to establish for its government a free democratic republic, even he -- George Washington -- could not help but entertain serious doubts as to whether the American people would succeed in self-government.

A lot of us think of George Washington as a rock, metaphorically, who would never be fatigued, never be deterred, and never fazed by any power or threat, however formidable it might be.  My point is that this is not entirely true.  Washington genuinely came to fear that what he and all the rest had fought for -- free government in America -- would fail.  This, however, is not to say that he gave up on it.  We have all heard (due to its fame) how at the end of the war, Washington freely returned to Congress the power that he had possessed and refused the power that he could easily have obtained.  A less famous fact is that as the Constitutional Convention approached a few years later, Washington even initially resisted the request that he participate in the convention.  He wanted the convention to succeed, but he believed that a different person in his place could serve as well as or better than he could himself.

Other people thought otherwise; among other things, Washington could give the convention credibility and sympathy that it otherwise would not likely have.  Such people finally convinced Washington that although there was still hope for America, it needed and deserved every advantage it could get.  They convinced him that in this case, that meant that America needed George Washington.

On that condition, Washington could not refuse, and his decision to accept that call back into the service of his country most likely gave the convention, the Constitution, and ultimately the United States what they needed in order to succeed.  My point, however, is that as well as we know how much his participation contributed to the cause, he did not agree to go to the convention because he was certain of what was to come; George Washington went to the convention because he knew it could fail, and he knew that it would most certainly fail if good people neglected it because of their doubts, or for any other reason.  Further, he knew that if it could fail -- if free government in America could fail -- it was his obligation to do everything that could be done to ensure that it would not.

It is not unusual for people who care about the future to experience doubt, and sometimes even dismay, as they watch the future form.  As I read Washington's correspondence from those years, witnessing in chronological order Washington's reactions to events, I concluded that Washington's strength was not in somehow being incapable of fear and doubt.  The source of his strength, to the extent that it is reflected in his writing, was in his determination.  The events that we witness may well justify profound doubts concerning what the future will become -- whether the shape that it is taking is something that we are prepared to allow.  George Washington (and others of America's founding generations) witnessed such events, but he persisted and (with the help of others) prevailed because whenever and to whatever extent those events led him to fear for America's future, his determination supplied what his confidence otherwise would have lacked.

And I write all of this because Washington's example has something to offer those who despair, if they can find their way to making it work for themselves.  An optimistic outlook and the will to continue are not reserved for those people (if any exist) who expect a good future to which they intend to be mere bystanders.  Though some things are admittedly beyond our control, there is more that can be done (especially with time) than most of us are used to thinking.  A good future is an end better fitting determination than anticipation alone.

Summarizing That

Since yesterday's post was pretty long, I offer the following summary of it:

I ascertained the identity of the city that the population range (which until recently appeared at IC 7.1-3-1-25(a)(7)) which I had discussed in an earlier post had been designed to identify (but to do so without identifying the city by name).  The city that this population range of 4,950 to 5,000 people had been meant to identify is Whiting, Indiana.

However, this no longer really matters, because the current Indiana General Assembly (during its session earlier this year) enacted legislation (see pages 13 through 16) which has purged IC 7.1-3-1-25 of the absurdities and the unconstitutionality (as that code section had repeatedly defied the limits imposed by the Indiana Constitution's Article 4, Sections 22 and 23 on the General Assembly's power to pass special and local laws) that I had previously written about and criticized.

I do not know what prompted the General Assembly to do this; I am not aware that anyone had pressured it to do so, and I cannot imagine how cleaning up this Indiana Code section could have been expected to work to anyone's political advantage.  Until I learn more about what led the legislature to make this revision, I am taking advantage of this opportunity to (tentatively, and while the opportunity lasts) believe that the legislator or legislators most responsible for it just wanted there to be a little less absurdity, impropriety, and clever* unconstitutionality in the Indiana Code.


* It was probably supposed to have been clever, but I am not impressed.  If those who introduced the abuse of population ranges had been clever enough to conceal that it was just an attempt to get away with violating the Indiana Constitution, they would not have left it all so obvious.

A Mystery Solved And An Abuse Corrected

Last year, the Indiana General Assembly finally succeeded in putting an end to the state's Sunday-only prohibition of the "carryout" sale of alcohol.  Though what the legislature left in place still needs improvement (the Indiana Code now permits carryout sales on Sundays, but only from 12 PM to 8 PM; for every other day of the week, these sales are permitted from 7 AM to 3 AM the following day), it has now at least made some progress that past General Assemblies had inexplicably struggled with.

While Indiana's Sunday-only prohibition of "carryout" alcohol sales was still in effect, I discussed some of the bizarre and seemingly unconstitutional (as violations of Indiana's constitution, not of the United States Constitution) exceptions to it which had at some point been written into the Indiana Code.  In one post, I gave extra attention to one that was a particularly transparent abuse -- one which, in using population ranges to identify the cities and counties to which the benefit of a certain exemption would be limited, designed one of those population ranges to extend the exemption to cities with populations between 4,950 and 5,000.  The only "mystery" was the question of which city that population range was meant to identify -- it was obvious that the General Assembly that had set that range (and any General Assembly which was responsible for that range's counterparts in older versions of the Indiana Code; the range had already been adjusted at least once to reflect a change in the population of its target city) intended to identify and extend the exemption to a specific city, using a narrow population range to identify the city in place of the city's name.  (Presumably, someone was under the impression that Article 4, Section 23 of the Indiana Constitution, which limits the General Assembly's power to make special and local laws, would be no obstacle so long as the General Assembly identified the place or places where a local law was to apply without identifying them by name.  Presumably, that "someone" also thought that this was clever.)  When I last wrote about this, I had been unable to figure out which city the occasionally-adjusted population range that appeared in IC 7.1-3-1-25(a)(7) was meant to identify.

Last month, I decided to look into whether I could obtain online (in sufficient detail, including the population numbers for each Indiana city and county) the U.S. Census data that the General Assembly would presumably have used in establishing and updating the population range in IC 7.1-3-1-25(a)(7).  I found the census data that I needed from both 2000 and 2010, and comparing the populations of Indiana cities with the population range appearing in IC 7.1-3-1-25(a)(7) (comparing the 2000 data with the population range required as of 2006 and comparing the 2010 data with the population range as modified in 2012), I was able to determine that the city of Whiting, Indiana is the city which that absurdly narrow population range was meant to identify.  I still have no idea what the purpose was of extending to Whiting an exemption that was withheld from so many other cities (and counties) in Indiana.

However, I am pleased to report that during its session earlier this year, the Indiana General Assembly revised IC 7.1-3-1-25, eliminating all traces of that section's former abuse of population ranges and giving its provisions uniform operation throughout the state (just as the Indiana Constitution requires!).  I am even more pleased by this than I would otherwise have been because the General Assembly appears to have done this on its own initiative, without being under any political pressure that I am aware of to do so, and even though it would be difficult to benefit politically by fixing something that would take such a long time to explain and that directly affects so few people.

I may yet discover what it actually was that led the current General Assembly to (seemingly spontaneously) clean up IC 7.1-3-1-25, but for the moment, while I still have the luxury of enjoying this, I am going to continue to entertain the extraordinary possibility that a legislature was motivated simply by a desire to cure the previous version of this section either of its absurdity and impropriety or of its unconstitutionality.

UPDATE (June 30, 2019, 5:40 PM EST): Video of committee proceedings (specifically, from a meeting of the Indiana House of Representatives' Public Policy Committee on February 6, 2019) concerning the bill which has now revised and corrected IC 7.1-3-1-25, as discussed above, provides evidence of the General Assembly's true motive (or at least of the motive of the bill's author, Rep. Ben Smaltz) for fixing that section of the Indiana Code.  It appears that this action really was motivated by a recognition of the absurdity and impropriety of the way that that section had used population ranges and by a desire to make Indiana's alcohol laws more rational.  To witness this for yourself (using the link that I just provided), view the video of the Wednesday, February 6 meeting and move the video ahead to 41:41.  Feel free to take pleasure in this; we should savor these moments whenever we find them.  After all: Somebody has done something good!

Concerning Perceptions of Hopeless and Irremediable Decline

Given how common they are, it takes little effort (and even that little effort will have deserved a better use) to find people who insist that some community or another of which they are a part is approaching its demise and is beyond all hope of reclamation.  The people to whom I am referring are not those who are convinced of the decline only once they have good reason to be -- sometimes, of course, the decline is real, and a person is not necessarily irrational for concluding that to be the case (even when it is not).  Rather, the people of whom I am writing are those who reach that conclusion so readily, and who so prematurely determine that it is impossible either to prevent this downfall or to recover from it, that they appear to have found in hopelessness their own strange equivalent to pleasure.

(I am confident, however, that this incomprehensible taste for voluntary despondency is not an inherent trait possessed by certain people but to which other people are not susceptible.  Otherwise, it would be difficult to explain how it is that this taste becomes fashionable, from time to time, at which time larger numbers of people than usual begin to gather and to socialize by exchanging with each other their reasons for believing that everyone around them is doomed.)

On this subject is the following, written by a publisher who encountered such a person while living in Philadelphia:

“There are in every country morose beings, who are always prognosticating ruin.   There was one of this stamp at Philadelphia.  He was a man of fortune, declined in years, had an air of wisdom, and a very grave manner of speaking.  His name was Samuel Mickle.  I knew him not; but he stopped one day at my door, and asked me if I was the young man who had lately opened a new printing-house.   Upon my answering in the affirmative, he said that he was very sorry for me, as it was an expensive undertaking, and the money that had been laid out upon it would be lost, Philadelphia being a place falling into decay; its inhabitants, having all, or nearly all of them, been obliged to call together their creditors.  That he knew, from undoubted fact, the circumstances which might lead us to suppose the contrary, such as new buildings, and the advanced price of rent, to be deceitful appearances, which in reality contributed to hasten the general ruin; and he gave me so long a detail of misfortunes, actually existing, or which were soon to take place, that he left me almost in a state of despair.  Had I known this man before I entered into trade, I should doubtless never have ventured.  He continued, however, to live in this place of decay, and to declaim in the same style, refusing for many years to buy a house because all was going to wreck, and in the end I had the satisfaction to see him pay five times as much for one as it would have cost him had he purchased it when he first began his lamentations.”

- Dr. Benjamin Franklin, writing of a prediction that had been made to him as a young man in the 1720s, by an acquaintance in Philadelphia