Monday, February 6, 2012

Liberty, Part XX

Cicero:

“For of all the questions on which our philosophers argue, there is none which it is more important thoroughly to understand than this, that man is born for justice, and that law and equity are not a mere establishment of opinion, but an institution of nature. This truth will become still more apparent if we investigate the nature of human association and society.”

“On the other hand, if we are determined to the practice of goodness, not by its own intrinsic excellence, but for the sake of some private advantage, we are cunning, rather than good men. What will not that man do in the dark who fears nothing but a witness and a judge? Should he meet a solitary individual in a desert place, with a large sum of money about him, and altogether unable to defend himself from being robbed, how would he behave? In such a case the man whom we have represented to be honest from principle, and the nature of the thing itself, would converse with the stranger, assist him, and show him the way. But as to the man who does nothing for the sake of another, and measures every thing by the advantage it brings to himself, it is obvious, I suppose, how such a one would act; and should he deny that he would kill the man or rob him of his treasure, his reason for this cannot be that he apprehends there is any moral turpitude in such actions, but only because he is afraid of a discovery, and the bad consequences that would thence ensue. A sentiment this, at which not only learned men, but even clowns must blush.”

“It is therefore an absurd extravagance in some philosophers to assert that all things are necessarily just, which are established by the civil laws and the institutions of the people. Are then the laws of tyrants just, simply because they are laws?”

...


“There can be but one essential justice, which cements society, and one law which establishes this justice. This law is right reason, which is the true rule of all commandments and prohibitions. Whoever neglects this law, whether written or unwritten, is necessarily unjust and wicked.”

“But if justice consists in submission to written laws and national customs, and if, as the Epicureans persist in affirming, every thing must be measured by utility alone, he who wishes to find an occasion of breaking such laws and customs, will be sure to discover it. So that real justice remains powerless if not supported by nature, and this pretended justice is overturned by that very utility which they call its foundation.”

“But this is not all. If nature does not ratify law, all the virtues lose their sway. What becomes of generosity, patriotism, or friendship? Where should we find the desire of benefitting our neighbours, or the gratitude that acknowledges kindness? For all these virtues proceed from our natural inclination to love and cherish our associates. This is the true basis of justice, and without this, not only the mutual charities of men, but the religious services of the gods, would become obsolete; for these are preserved, as I imagine, rather by the natural sympathy which subsists between divine and human beings, than by mere fear and timidity.”

“But if the opinions and suffrages of foolish men had sufficient weight to outbalance the nature of things, might they not determine among them, that what is essentially bad and pernicious should henceforth pass for good and beneficial? Or why should not a law able to enforce injustice, take the place of equity? Would not this same law be able to change evil into good, and good into evil?”

“As far as we are concerned, we have no other rule capable of distinguishing between a good or a bad law, than our natural conscience and reason. These, however, enable us to separate justice from injustice, and to discriminate between the honest and the scandalous. For common sense has impressed in our minds the first principles of things, and has given us a general acquaintance with them, by which we connect with Virtue every honourable and excellent quality, and with Vice all that is abominable and disgraceful.”

“Now we must entirely take leave of our senses, ere we can suppose that law and justice have no foundation in nature, and rely merely on the transient opinions of men. We should not venture to praise the virtue of a tree or a horse, in which expression there is an abuse of terms, were we not convinced that this virtue was in their nature, rather than in our opinion. For a stronger reason, it is mainly with respect to the moral nature of things, that we ought to speak of honour and shame among men.”

Sunday, February 5, 2012

Liberty, Part XIX

William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England:


“II. We are next to consider the violation of the right of personal liberty. This is effected by the injury of false imprisonment, for which the law has not only decreed a punishment, as a heinous public crime, but has also given a private reparation to the party; as well by removing the actual confinement for the present, as, after it is over, by subjecting the wrongdoer to a civil action, on account of the damage sustained by the loss of time and liberty.”

“To constitute the injury of false imprisonment there are two points requisite: 1. The detention of the person; and, 2. The unlawfulness of such detention. Every confinement of the person is an imprisonment, whether it be in a common prison, or in a private house, or in the stocks, or even by forcibly detaining one in the public streets. Unlawful, or false, imprisonment consists in such confinement or detention without sufficient authority: which authority may arise either from some process from the courts of justice; or from some warrant from a legal officer having power to commit, under his hand and seal, and expressing the cause of such commitment, or from some other special case warranted, for the necessity of the thing, either by common law, or act of parliament; such as the arresting of a felon by a private person without warrant, the impressing of mariners for the public service, or the apprehending of waggoners for misbehaviour in the public highways."

Saturday, February 4, 2012

Just Me

Last year, while I was collecting all of these quotes, I evidently wrote the following in response to something that James Wilson had written about the power or right of majorities of the people to reshape their constitutions in whatever way they desire:

"I do not think that that is true. How could a mere majority bind the minority in that way – and, if it did, wouldn’t it make the idea that all the people in any way consent to the acts of their representatives utterly chimerical? They would not have agreed to the terms or limits of the powers delegated. They would not have agreed to the selection of representatives. What did they consent to, other than the formation of government, which arguably did not depend upon their consent in the first place (a government can be created without their actual consent, and it can operate on them; they have the right to be a part of it and, collectively, to alter or abolish it, and replace it, but if government is union of our rights to self-defense, why would some of the people need the consent of others in order to commence government? Maybe there is no consent to the existence of government, and no need to consent to it, but the people do have the right to shape and reshape its form, provided that they do not make it into anything that it is not, and which it may not justly become)? The majority has no right to make a constitution that is inconsistent with or unnecessarily dangerous to the rights of anyone.

"Whether a nation has a written constitution or not, therefore, natural law -- the inherent rules of equity and justice -- must be a part of their constitution. It shapes what, precisely, the people ever had the right to institute, and, therefore, what they lawfully may have possibly instituted."

That is absolutely right.  I suppose it is debatable whether the term "constitution" should be understood as including natural law or as referring, instead, to the part which is made by humans (which must nevertheless necessarily be shaped and controlled by natural law) but either way, while there is some importance to the idea that a valid constitution should be established by a majority, rather than a minority, the real issue is the extent to which that whole package of powers, forms, and limitations is consistent with justice.  The majority should have its choice between constitutions which are not inconsistent with the demands of justice.  Additionally, as a practical matter, it should also be the majority (or its representatives) who ascertain the demands of justice and evaluate different arrangements of powers, forms, and limitations as to how they would meet those demands.  However, no majority has a power to make it just for its government to do what is otherwise unjust.  I am not simply saying that a majority should not do this -- I am saying that it is not a possible act.  A majority can cause that kind of system to be established and enforced, but the government's just and legitimate powers will be controlled by natural law, not by popular sovereignty.

Concerning Arrests and Home Entries

I would like to briefly interrupt this series on the definition of liberty to bring you a passage by Blackstone concerning arrests and home entries by police officers:


“An arrest must be by corporal seising or touching the defendant's body; after which the bailiff may justify breaking open the house in which he is, to take him; otherwise he has no such power; but must watch his opportunity to arrest him. For every man's house is looked upon by the law to be his castle of defence and asylum, wherein he should suffer no violence. Which principle is carried so far in the civil law, that for the most part not so much as a common citation or summons, much less an arrest, can be executed upon a man within his own walls.”

Although this passage (unlike others that I have found and posted) does not directly relate to the central issue in the Barnes decisions of the Indiana Supreme Court, last year, it does show how distant the Court's new doctrine is from the principles and concerns of the common law (which neither the people of this state nor our representatives have ever authorized the Court to replace or destroy).

Liberty, Part XVIII

William Blackstone, from his Commentaries on the Laws of England:


“Next to personal security, the law of England regards, asserts, and preserves the personal security of individuals. This personal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or removing one’s person to whatever place one’s own inclination may direct; without imprisonment or restraint, unless by due course of law. Concerning which we may make the same observations as upon the preceding article; that it is a right strictly natural; that the laws of England have never abridged it without sufficient cause; and, that in this kingdom it cannot ever be abridged at the mere discretion of the magistrate, without the explicit permission of the laws.”

“Of great importance to the public is the preservation of this personal liberty: for if once it were left in the power of any, the highest, magistrate to imprison arbitrarily whomever he or his officers thought proper, (as in France it is daily practiced by the crown) there would soon be an end to all other rights and immunities. Some have thought, that unjust attacks, even upon life, or property, at the arbitrary will of the magistrate, are less dangerous to the commonwealth, than such as are made upon the personal liberty of the subject. To bereave a man of life, or by violence to confiscate his estate, without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole kingdom. But confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to goal, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, a less striking, and therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government. And yet sometimes, when the state is in real danger, even this may be a necessary measure. But the happiness of our constitution is, that it is not left to the executive power to determine when the danger of the state is so great, as to render this measure expedient. For the parliament only, or legislative power, can authorize the crown, by suspending the habeas corpus act for a short and limited time, to imprison suspected persons without giving any reason for so doing.”

“The confinement of the person, in any wise, is an imprisonment. So that the keeping a man against his will in a private house, putting him in the stocks, arresting or forcibly detaining him in the street, is an imprisonment.”

“A natural and regular consequence of this personal liberty, is, that every Englishman may claim a right to abide in his own country so long as he pleases; and not to be driven from it unless by the sentence of the law.”

Friday, February 3, 2012

Liberty, Part XVII

William Blackstone, from his Commentaries on the Laws of England:


“Hence we may collect that the law, which restrains a man from doing mischief to his fellow citizens, though it diminishes the natural, increases the civil liberty of mankind: but every wanton and causeless restraint of the will of the subject, whether practiced by a monarch, nobility, or a popular assembly, is a degree of tyranny. Nay, that even laws themselves, whether made with or without our consent, if they regulate and constrain our conduct in matters of mere indifference, without any good end in view, are laws destructive of liberty: whereas if any public advantage can arise from observing such precepts, the control of our private inclinations, in one or two particular points, will conduce to preserve our general freedom in others of more importance; by supporting that state, of society, which alone can secure our independence.”

...

“So that laws, when prudently framed, are by no means subversive but rather introductive of liberty; for (as Mr. Locke has well observed) where there is no law, there is no freedom. But then, on the other hand, that constitution or frame of government, that system of laws, is alone calculated to maintain civil liberty, which leaves the subject entire master of his own conduct, except in those points wherein the public good requires some direction or restraint.”

...

“The idea and practice of this political or civil liberty flourish in their highest vigour in these kingdoms, where it falls little short of perfection, and can only be lost or destroyed by the folly or demerits of its owner...”

“And this spirit of liberty is so deeply implanted in our constitution, and rooted even in our very soil, that a slave or a negro, the moment he lands in England, falls under the protection of the laws, and so far becomes a freeman, though the master’s right to his service may probably still continue.”

...

“The absolute rights of every Englishman (which, taken in a political and extensive sense, are usually called their liberties) as they are founded on nature and reason, so they are coeval with our form of government; though subject at times to fluctuate and change: their establishment (excellent as it is) being still human. At some times we have seen them depressed by overbearing and tyrannical princes; at others so luxuriant as even to tend to anarchy, a worse state than tyranny itself, as any government is better than none at all. But the vigour of our free constitution has always delivered the nation from these embarassments, and, as soon as the convulsions consequent on the struggle have been over, the balance of our rights and liberties has settled to its proper level; and their fundamental articles have been from time to time asserted in parliament, as often as they were thought to be in danger.”

Thursday, February 2, 2012

Liberty, Part XVI

From William Blackstone, from his Commentaries on the Laws of England:

“And, first, to demonstrate the utility of some acquaintance with the laws of the land, let us only reflect a moment on the singular frame and polity of that land, which is governed by this system of laws. A land, perhaps the only one in the universe, in which political or civil liberty is the very end and scope of the constitution. This liberty, rightly understood, consists in the power of doing whatever the laws permit; which is only to be effected by a general conformity of all orders and degrees to those equitable rules of action, by which the meanest individual is protected from the insults and oppression of the greatest.”

...

“By the absolute rights of individuals we mean those which are in their primary and strictest sense; such as would belong to their persons merely in a state of nature, and which every man is intitled to enjoy whether out of society or in it. But with regard to the absolute duties, which man is bound to perform considered as a mere individual, it is not to be expected that any human municipal laws should at all explain or enforce them. For the end and intent of such laws being only to regulate the behaviour of mankind, as they are members of society, and stand in various relations to each other, they have consequently no business or concern with any but social or relative duties. Let a man therefore be ever so abandoned in his principles, or vitious in his practice, provided he keeps his wickedness to himself, and does not offend against the rules of public decency, he is out of the reach of human laws. But if he makes his vices public, though they be such as seem principally to affect himself, (as drunkenness, or the like) then they become, by the bad example they set, of pernicious effects to society; and therefore it is then the business of human laws to correct them. Here the circumstance of publication is what alters the nature of the case. Public sobriety is a relative duty, and therefore enjoined by our laws; private sobriety is an absolute duty, which, whether it be performed or not, human tribunals can never know; and therefore they can never enforce it by any civil sanction. But, with respect to rights, the case is different. Human laws define and enforce as well those rights which belong to a man considered as an individual, as those which belong to him considered as related to others.”

...

“For the principal aim of society is to protect individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the immutable laws of nature; but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual assistance and intercourse, which is gained by the institution of friendly and social communities. Hence it follows, that the first and primary end of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absolute rights if individuals. Such rights as are social and relative result from, and are posterior to, the formation of states and societies: so that to maintain and regulate these is clearly a subsequent consideration. And therefore the principal view of human laws is, or ought always to be, to explain, protect, and enforce such rights as are absolute, which in themselves are few and simple; and, then, such rights as are relative, which arising from a variety of connexions, will be far more numerous and more complicated. These will take up a greater space in any code of laws, and hence may appear to be more attended to, though in reality they are not, than the rights of the former kind. Let us therefore proceed to examine how far all laws ought, and how far the laws of England actually do, take notice of these absolute rights, and provide for their lasting security.”

...

“The absolute rights of man, considered as a free agent, endowed with discernment to know good from evil, and with power of choosing those measures which appear to him to be most desirable, are usually summed up in one general appellation, and denominated the natural liberty of mankind. This natural liberty consists properly in a power of acting as one thinks fit, without any restraint or control, unless by the laws of nature; being a right inherent in us by birth, and one of the gifts of God to man at his creation, when he endued him with the faculty of free-will. But every man, when he enters into society, gives up a part of his natural liberty, as the price of so valuable a purchase; and in consideration of receiving the advantages of mutual commerce, obliges himself to conform to those laws, which the community has thought proper to establish. And this species of legal obedience and conformity is infinitely more desirable, than that wild and savage liberty which is sacrificed to obtain it. For no man, that considers a moment, would wish to retain the absolute and uncontroled power of doing whatever he pleases; the consequence of which is, that every other man would also have the same power; and then there would be no security to individuals in any of the enjoyments of life. Political therefore, or civil, liberty, which is that of a member of society, is no other than natural liberty so far restrained by human laws (and no farther) as is necessary and expedient for the general advantage of the public.”

I think that Nathaniel Chipman's comments on this last paragraph are helpful -- a person in society (or, more accurately, under a government) does lose a part of that complete freedom of action, but the right to take every conceivable action never belonged to him, because he was obligated as a matter of right to respect the equal rights of other people.  It is unnecessary for him to surrender his rightful liberty in order to establish government and cause the boundaries between the equal rights of each person to be ascertained, marked, and guarded.

There are a few (of what might be called) exceptions to this, but they develop the principle more than they constitute exceptions to it.  Automobile traffic is a good model to show how there are times when positive law can actually improve upon parts of natural law.  In the first place, it would be fair to say that the first rule of the road is to avoid running into other cars.  That rule does not need to be established by law (which is not to say that it should not be) in order to exist, because everyone knows that it is important to avoid running into other cars, and everyone wants to avoid running into other cars, anyway.  Though some people apparently like to test the limits of what they can do without running into other cars (and, of course, some collisions do happen), everyone tries to maneuver and negotiate in their own action and movement so as to avoid colliding with others.  In some ways, however, positive law assists this "natural law" of the road, in addition to holding those responsible for collisions civilly liable.  At intersections, the first rule of the road still applies, but it provides no preference for the flow of traffic on major thoroughfares, or stoplights, or stop or yield signs.  Without the assistance of positive rules, I assume that all intersections would be a more confusing and dangerous version of a four-way stop.  The establishment of uniform rules for various types of intersections may limit motorists' discretion somewhat, but it assists them in what they were already trying to do, and what they were already obligated to do by the "natural law" of the road.  (I do not mean to suggest that the kind of discretion that governments have with respect to these rules would exist even on private property, however -- actually, most of the situations in which governments could rightly impose these kinds of rules concern public property or resources, or other collisions of right, which governments ought to prevent from turning into collisions of people.)  The other major exception is that there is a duty to support the essential functions of the government, given that it is necessary, as a matter of justice, and that those who benefit from its operation ought to pay for it.  This, of course, is not to say that a person could be justly forced to pay for anything the government does, regardless of how extravagant or unjustified it is.

Wednesday, February 1, 2012

Liberty, Part XV

Nathaniel Chipman, from Principles of Government, a Treatise on Free Institutions, Including the Constitution of the United States:

“[W]e have before seen, that in a free government, an absolute, uncontrolled, and unlimited power is not committed to any one of its organs, and that it does not actually subsist in the British legislature, for whom it is so strenuously claimed. Certainly such power does not belong to the legislature of every state. It is not vested in the legislature of the United States, nor in that of any state in the union. Each is limited by the constitution from which it derives its power. The constitution is the supreme law established by the people, the ultimate supreme power in every free country; a law which the legislature is bound to obey in all its acts. Every act not warranted by the constitution is void, and with us is so decided by the courts of law. So far we may, with propriety, apply the definition to the law of the constitution, the fundamental law, that it is a rule of political conduct prescribed by the supreme power in the state; but it wholly fails, when applied to the derivative, to the municipal law. The positive laws enacted by the legislature, are prescribed by a competent authority instituted and limited by the supreme political power.”